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ABSTRACT
The general price level does not provide a sensitive indicator of
whether monetary policy is tight or loose, because mostprices are sticky.
Interest rates are free to move, but they are an ambiguous indicatorof
monetary policy: one does not know whether changes in the interest rate are
due to changes in the expected inflation rate or the real interestrate.
Commodity prices provide the ideal sensitive indicator.
This paper has two distinct aims. First, a theoretical model of Tover_
shooting" in commodity markets is presented. A known change in themoney
supply is shown to cause an instantaneous change in commodity prices that
is greater than the proportionate change that describeslong—run equilibrium.
Second, we take the occasion of the Fed's Friday money supplyannouncements
to test the theory. We find that an unexpectedly largemoney announcement
causes significant negative reactions in prices of six commodities. This
supports at once the sticky—price or overshooting view, and the notion that
the market has confidence in the Fed's commitment tocorrect any deviations
from its money growth targets.
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1.Introduction
Strict monetarist theory holds that excessivemoney growth, or the
expectation of future money growth, shows up immediately inrapid inflation
of goods prices. However, it is widelyagreed that for most goods, prices
are in fact sticky in the short run, and reflectmoney growth only in the
long run. If one seeks a sensitive market measure of theperceived
looseness or tightness of monetary policy, one must lookelsewhere than at
the general price level.
Interest rates, being determined in quickly adjusting financial
markets, are free to respond immediately to expectationsregarding monetary
policy. For example, every Friday at 4:10 p.m. Eastern Standard Timethe
Federal Reserve Board announces themoney stock for the week ending nine
days previously. If the announced money supply isgreater than what the
market had been expecting, interest ratesgenerally jump in the same
direction. Clearly they are responding to revisions of theexpected future
money supply path. But they are an ambiguous indicator of expectations.
On the one hand, an announced increase in themoney supply may be received
by the market as a sign that the Fed has increased itstarget money growth
rate. The higher expected money growth rate would thenimply a higher
expected inflation rate, and the rise in interest rates would beexplained
as an inflation premium. On the other hand, the marketmay have confidence
in the Fed's commitment to stick to itsmoney growth target and may
interpret the money supply change as an unintended fluctuationoriginating
in money demand or in the banking system. The market wouldthen expect the
Fed to contract the money supply in the near futureto get back to the
target path. The rise in nominal interest rates would be explainedas an2
increase in real interest rates, without anynecessary change in expected
inflation.
Arthur Okun (1975), among others, drew adistinction between manu-
factured goods (and other "customer goods"
and services) and basic cotnmo—
dities (or "auction goods"). The former arethe ones with sticky prices:
they are differentiated productstraded in imperfectly competitive markets
where there is no instantaneous arbitrageto insure perfect price
flexibility. But the latter do haveflexible prices: they are homogeneous
products traded in competitivemarkets where arbitrage does insure
instantaneous price adjustment.
Commodities are more like assets inthis
respect. Since their prices arefree to adjust from day to day, and even
from minute to minute, they offer a potentialmeasure of the market's
perception of current monetary policy.And, unlike interest rates, they
are an unambiguous indication
of the direction in which monetary expecta-
tions are revised, as we will see.
While the literature on commodity pricesis extensive, the macro-
economic side of the subject has beenrelatively neglected. Okun himself
recognized that commodity priceswould be sensitive indicators of infla-
tionary expectations. It is not justthat commodity prices are free to
adjust and others are not.Commodities tend to be more easilystored and
resold, so that they take on the speculative
quality of assets as well. An
expectation of future inflationwill raise demand for commodity stocks,and
thus drive up the price today.Indeed the sensitivity of commodity prices,
particularly precious metals, to expected moneygrowth is a familiar pheno-
menon to market participantsand the financial press. (See for examplethe
editorial in the Wall Street Journalof January 21, 1983, which points to
rising gold prices as the firstindicator that the Fed is anew losingits3
grip on the money supply.)' The dampening effect that high real interest
rates have on commodity prices is also recognized, though less often. In
the short—term financial markets, high interest rates are thought of as
reducing commodity prices because they make bonds more attractive to
investors and commodity contracts less attractive. In the longer—term
context of the fundamental supply and demand for the commodity, high
interest rates are thought of as reducing the demand for commodities and
therefore the prices because, along with storage costs, they constitute the
cost of carrying inventories over into the next period.
What is missing from the literature, so far as we know, is a complete
model of monetary policy and the determination of commodity prices that
recognizes both the positive effect of an expected long—run rate of money
growth and inflation, and the negative effect of currently tight liquidity
and high real interest rates. We wish in particular to analyze the over-
shooting phenomenon that is familiar from models of the foreign exchange
market.2 Consider a sudden knoone percent drop in the money supply
that is expected to be permanent. In the long run we would expect all
prices, manufactured goods as well as commodities, to fall by one percent,
in the absence of new disturbances. But in the short run manufacture
prices are fixed. Thus the reduction in the nominal money supply is a
reduction in the real money supply. To equilibrate money demand, interest
rates of course rise. But we have an arbitrage condition that must hold in
the commodity markets: since commodities are storable, the rate of return
on Treasury bills can be no greater than the expected rate of increase of
commodity prices, plus storage costs. This means that the spot price of
commodities must fall today, and must fall by more than the one percent
that it is expected to fall in the long run. In other words, commodities4
prices must overshoot their long—run value. Onlythen can there be a
rational market anticipation of future capital gain that is sufficient to
offset the higher interest rate. The overshooting phenomenon canbe
thought of as a macroeconomic example of the Le Chatelier principle:
because one variable in the system (manufactured goods prices)is not free
to adjust, the other variables in the system (commodity prices)must jump
correspondingly farther in order to compensate.
Consider now a sudden increase in the expected long—run rateof money
growth, with no change in the current actual money supply.Of course the
rate of increase of all prices, manufactured goods aswell as commodities,
will in the long run be equal to the new rate of money growth, inthe
absence of new disturbances.(We are taking secular growth in real income
and in velocity as exogenous, and for simplicity equal to zero.)In the
long run the inflation rate will be built into a highnominal interest
rate.3 But in the short run the nominal interest rate does not rise
fully to reflect the higher inflation rate. Thereal interest rate falls.
Now recall the arbitrage condition that precludes a differencebetween the
interest rate and the expected rate of increase of commodity pricesplus
storage costs. At the moment of the increasein the expected rate of money
growth, commodity prices must jump up above their long—runequilibrium
path. Only then can there be a rational market anticipationof future de-
preciation (relative to the long—run inflation ratein the economy) that is
sufficient to offset the lower (real) interest rate. Thus wehave over-
shooting of equilibrium in this case as well.
In Section 2 we develop the model of determination of commodity prices
that formalizes this notion of overshooting in response to changesin the
expected level or growth rate of the money supply. However,the over—5
shooting theory is only the first stage of this paper. In Section 3 we go
on to examine empirically how futures prices for six commodities (gold,
silver, sugar, cocoa, cattle and feeders) respond to the Fed's weekly money
supply announcements. We find significant negative reactions to money
surprises between the close of the market on Friday and the open on Monday.
Clearly the market responds to positive money surprises by anticipating a
future monetary contraction and an increase in the real interest rate,
which causes commodity prices to fall immediately. These empirical
findings can be used for two distinct purposes. First they can be thought
of as a clean test of the sticky—price or overshooting theory, one with
remarkably favorable results. Second, they can be thought of as a test of
the credibility of the Fed to stick to its money growth targets. The
results are evidence that the Fed did have high credibility with the market
during the 1980—82 period.6
2. The Overshooting Model of CommodityPrices4
We define two prices, the price of commodities, PC in logform, and the
price of manufactures, pin log form. Commodities are storable and thus
subject to the arbitrage condition that their expectedrate of change
e
minus storage costs sc ,isequal to the short—term nominal interest rate
i
Sc . (1)
(We assume that the risk premium is either equal to zero oris subsumed in
the storage costs, which are assumed constant.) Itwill turn out that the
level of pis determined by equation (1) together with the restof the
model and the assumption that expectations are rational. Anyreaders who
are not thrilled by the algebra of saddle—path equilibriaare invited to
skiptoequation (15).
Unlike the commodities, the level of manufacture pricesis fixed by its
own past history. It can adjust in response to excessdemand only gradually
over time, in accordance with an expectations—augmentedPhillips curve:
(2)
where d is the log of demand for manufactures, yis the log of potential
output in that sector, and p is a term representingthe expected secular
rate of Inflation. Here we can think of p as the expectedrate of money
growth.5 Excess demand is in turn defined to be an increasing function of
the price of commodities relative to manufactures, andadecreasing function
of the real interestrate:6
d_y=(Pc_Pm)_a(i_P_r)
. (3)
We can think of as any constant term. But ourdefinition of long—run
equilibrium will be zero excess demand = .Soin long—run equilibrium7
the relative price of the two commodities (p —p)settles down to a
given value (— p) ,forconvenience normalized at zero in log form,
and the real interest rate (i —ii)settles down to the given constant
value r
We substitute (3) in (2).
=
Tf[(Pc
- - -- r)]+ . (4)
The last sector of our model is the money market. We assume asimple
money demand equation:
m—p=cy--Ai , (5)
where m is the log of the nominal money supply,p is the log of the
overall price level, y is the log of total output, is the elasticity
of money demand with respect to output, and A is the semi—elasticity of
money demand with respect to the interest rate. The overall price level is
an average of manufacture prices, with weight a ,andcommodity prices,
with weight (1 —a)
+ (1 —a)p (6)
Substituting in (5),
m —m
—(1— = — Xi . (7)
We now consider the long—run equilibrium version of themoney demand
equation:
—ct— (1—a)=—XI
(8)
where we have used our result that the long—run real interest rate i —
is
We take the difference of the two equations (7) and (8)
ct(p — + (1— ct)(p — =X(i—— r) , (9)8
where we have assumed that there are no expected changesin the money supply
(m rn)other than the expected rate of constant growth, and wehave for
simplicity here taken output to be fixed at thelevel of potential output:7
y=y
Now we bring the different components of our model together.We combine
equations (1) and (9):
= m —+ (1 'c
+ i + r + se . (10)
We also combine equations (4) and (9) (and use thenormalization p —m0 ):
=c
-m
- -m
- +(1 -- c1+
=-[+ /X](p -+ [—(l -a)/X](p- + . (11)
We close the model by assuming that expectations areformed rationally:
PC =P .Equations(10) and (11) can be represented in matrix form:
+ ac/A) -a(1-)/X) (p
m m
— (12)
L
(1- )/X (p + r + SC
Thecharacteristic roots for (12) are the solutions and to
[- + /X) + ][(1 -)/X+ ei- (/X)-(l-)/X)=0
-O =[-(1-)/2X + + /X)/2] + (13)
The solutions for the expected future paths of the two pricesin level form,
as T goes from 0 to ,are:
— Pm(T) =exp(—0T)[Pm(O) —m(0)1
and p(T) —(T)=exp(—O
—(0)]
(14)
where —Ois the negative root from (13).9
(We have thrown out the positive root to insure stability.) In rate—of—
change form the equations are:8
—e m— +
(p_)+p++5c
. (15)
Notice that in the special case in which manufacture prices are perfectly
flexible (ii, theirresponsiveness to excess demand, is infinite), B is
infinite, and the entire system adjusts to its long—run equilibrium
instantaneously.
Most of the preceding was simply to establish that the rationally expected
rate of change of commodities prices takes the simple regressive form of (15).
Combining with the arbitrage condition (1):
— 1 .
—
(16)
Notice that an increase in the real interest rate i —iabove its long—run
equilibrium level r causes commodity prices pto fall below their long—run
equilibrium path .Itis necessary that commodities be currently "under-
valued" so that there will be an expected future rate of increase in the
price sufficient to offset the high real interest rate. Notice further that
the higher is the speed of adjustment 0 ,theless will preact. It is
a slow speed of adjustment in manufactured goods markets(7r ,towhich 0
is directly related that causes overshooting in the commodity riarkets.
What determines the long—run equilibrium path ?In the long run,
relative prices are determined exogenously, so
Pc=Pm=P=rn_+A(+1) , (17)10
where we have used the long—run money demand equation (8). Substitutinginto
(16),
(18)
We see that, aside from the effect of the real interest rate, an increase
in the expected long—run rate of money growth increases the current
and therefore the current p .Wethus have what we wanted, a model of
c
commodity prices that shows both the negative effect of the realinterest rate
and the positive effect of the expected long—run money growth rate. We
will call it the "overshooting model" to distinguish it from the special
case in which all prices are perfectly flexible and so the systemis always
at its long—run equilibrium.
3. The Market Reaction to Weekly Money Announcements
The positive reaction of short—term interest rates to surprises in the
Fed's weekly money announcements is by nowwell—documented.9 Several papers
have looked at the reactions in other markets: Engel and Frankel (1982)and
Cornell (1982b) for foreign exchange, Pearce and Roley (1982) for equities,and
Hardouvelis (1982) for both. The motivation has often been similar to ours
here. If the explanation for the increase in the interest rate is an increase
in expected inflation, then the price of foreign exchange or equities,like the
price of commodities, should in theory move in the same direction.If the
explanation for the increase in the interest rate is an increasein the real
interest rate, then the price of foreign exchange or equities, like the price
of commodities, should move in the other direction. In each market, expected
inflation raises the long—run equilibrium price. And in each market thereal11
interest rate reduces the currentspot price relative to the long—run equilib-
rium price.10 But, to our knowledge,no one has previously looked at the
reactions of commodity prices to themoney announcements.
It is of course the money surprise that
should matter, the excess of the
announced money supply over what had beenexpected by the market. If
markets are efficient, whatevercomponent of the announcement that was
predictable will already have beenincorporated into the interest rate and
other financial market prices. Themarket's expectations are determinednot
only by past money supply figures, but by officialpronouncements and many
other factors as well. Any
attempt to measure expected money growth by, for
example, an ARIMA model of the money supply time
series, is unlikely to be
accurate. Fortunately there exists a convenientmeasure of market expectations.
Money Market Services, Inc., each weeksurveys sixty individuals who make
predictions of what the Fridaymoney announcement will be, and reports the
11
average.
Before we turn to the empirical
results, let us backtrack for a moment and
examine why the weekly money announcementphenomenon is a good way to test
the overshooting theory that wedeveloped in the previous section. Onecan
imagine other ways of testing the theory. Forexample, we could estimate
equation (18), regressing monthlycommodity prices against the money supply
real income, the short—term interestrate, and some measure of the expected
inflation rate. But we could nothope for good results. Commodityprices are
determined by weather and a whole host ofother real factors thatprobably
overwhelm the monetary factors consideredhere. Our monetary model was
intended to be nothing more thana model of how commodity pricesmove relative
to their real equilibrium. (One couldadd an exogenous, thoughchanging,12
real term —pin equations (17) and (18).) Wewould have to try to model
the other real factors if we were tohave any hope of getting statistically
significant results. Nor wouldthe high sum of squared residuals be ouronly
problem. Each of the righthand—Sidevariables in equation (18) can be con-
vincingly argued to be endogenouS.Thus the regression estimates wouldbe
biased and inconsistent.
The weekly money supply announcement phenomenon
is a perfect opportunity
to test the theory, for two reasons.
First, if we look at the change between
the close of the market on Fridayand the open on Monday, we have groundsfor
hope that relatively littlewill happen in between to affect market prices,
other than the Fed's money announcement.
Of course some relevant news will
come out over the weekend. Butthe other factors will be far less important
than they would be ma context ofweek—to—week or month—to—month changes.
Second, there is good reason tobelieve that the money surprise is predeter-
mined, i.e. that the error term arisingfrom other weekend news will be
independent of the money surprise:both the money announcement and the expec-
tations survey are cormuitted to paperbefore the Friday market close. Thus
endogeneity problems vanish.
From our equation (18), the changein conunodity prices in response to a
money announcement (assuming nochange in the actual current money supplyon
Friday at 4:10) is:
=(X+l/e)Ai —1/0i
=(x+ lie) -(1/0) , (19)
where Eisthe market estimate of the transitory componentof last week's13
money supply, which is expected to be removed, and iindicatesits effect
on the interest rate.'2 Thus
Ap =[(A+1/0)a —(l/0)b] DME , (20)
where DME is the money surprise, "a" isthe proportion of it assigned to
Ai and "b" is the proportion of itassigned to AE .(SeeMussa (1975
for a model showing that this form ofexpectations is rational, for themoney
supply process we have assumed and for particularvalues of a and b ; and
see Hardouvelis (1982) for an example.)
In Table 1 we show the results ofregressing various market prices against
the money surprise. Themoney surprise is defined as the logarithmic change in
the money supply announced at 4:10p.m. on Friday from that announced one week
previously, minus the change predicted by thesurvey. The dependent variable
is the logaritljc change in the marketprice at the Monday opening from the
price at the Friday close (times 100, toget the change in percent).13'14
We begin with the results for bond and
foreign exchange markets,
territory that has been covered in earlierpapers. The highly significant
negative coefficient on the price of 3—monthTreasury bills illustrates once
again the well—documented fact that the interest
rate reacts positively to a
money surprise. The negative reaction in theprices of the longer—term bonds
is even more significant.5
The statistically significantnegative coefficient for the dollar price
of Swiss francs, and the almost—significantnegative coefficient for the
dollar price of Canadian dollars, in
themselves constitute evidence that the
reaction in the nominal interest rate isa reaction in the real interest
rate, not in the expected inflation rate.Table 1
Dependent Variable: Percentage change inmarket price, Open Monday over
Close Friday
Independent Variable: Percentage money growthannounced in excess of
expectations
Sample: December 5, 1980—November 1,1982 (100 observations)
Money Growth 2
Market Constant Surprise R D—W SSR
Treasury .081 _l.087* .207 1.84115.98
Bond (.109) (.215)
GNMA .131 _l.OOl* .258 1.92 74.20
(.087) (.172)
Treasury .087* _.428* .249 1.81 14.19
Bill (.038) (.075)
Swiss Franc .084 _.520* .081 2.17 79.08
(.090) (.177)
Canadian —.008 —.087 .035 1.95 5.42
Dollar (.024) (.046)
Gold —.096 _•944* .064 2.36337.09
(.186) (.366)
Silver —.383 _1.005* .050 2.37489.98
(.225) (.441)
Sugar —.360 _.878* .047 1.89400.87
(.203) (.399)
Cocoa .044 —.255 .008 1.55219.40
(.150) (.295)
Cattle .160 _•443* .041 2.25116.87
(.110) (.215)
Feeders .010 —.267 .031 2.21 57.57
(.077) (.151)
*Significant at the 95% level (standard errorsin parentheses).
14Table 2
Stacked Commodity Regressions
Dependent Variable: Percentage change in market price
Independent Variable: Announced money growth in excess ofexpectations
Sample: December 5, 1980—November 1, 1982 (6 x 100600 observations)
Money Growth
2
Surprise R D—W SSR
—.632* .036 2.111659.07
(.134)
—.432* .029 2.09 599.73
(.102)
Mid—day Monday
over
—.166*
(.041)
.133
(.080)
.005 1.97 594.84
Open Monday —.173*
(.041)
.053
(.068)
.001 2.03 600.94
Close Monday
over
— .163*
(.073)
.085
(.144)
.001 1.871911.89
Mid—day Monday —.090*
(.041)
—.001
(.105)
.000 1.88 591.40
Close Monday
over
— .330*
(.080)
.218
(.157)
.003 1.882261.84
Open Monday —.177*
(.041)
.036
(.113)
.000 1.90 594.28
Close Monday
over
—.458*
(.105)
—.414*
(.206)
.007 2.043897.91
Close F'riday — .172*
(.041)
-.406*
(.150)
.012 2.03 590.92
Open Monday
over
Close Friday
Constant
—.128
(.068)
—.061
(.041)
15
(a) *impliessignificance at the 95% level (standard errors in parentheses).
(b) The second line of estimates corrects forheteroscedasticity across the
six different commodities.16
But the new results are those for the six commodities.In each case
the reaction is negative, and in every case but cocoaand feeders it is
significant. Even gold and silver, which are so widely reputedto be hyper-
sensitive to fears of monetary growth and inflation, clearly moveinversely
to the money announcement.
The levels of econometric significance in Table 1 are already high by
macroeconomic standards. But to get more efficient estimates, we"stacked"
the observations for all six commodities in a single regression.In other
words, we constrained all reaction coefficients to be the same.This constraint
comes out of the theory. A consultation with equation(18) or (19) will
recall the fact that an increase in the real interest rate causesovershooting
of commodity prices to an extent determined only by0 ,thespeed of adjust-
ment of the sticky manufacture prices, because that iswhat drives the whole
macroeconomy, not by any characteristic ofthe individual commodities. And
an increase in the expected inflation rate causes an upwardshift in equilibrium
commodity prices of a magnitude determined by X ,thesemi—elasticity of
money demand with respect to the interest rate,again not by any characteristics
of the individual commodities. Only if a change in the steady—stateinflation
rate implied a change in the relative price of commoditiesin long—run
equilibrium, i.e. only if money were non—neutral evenin the long run, would
expected inflation have more effect on some commodity pricesthan on others.16
The same is true of effects on foreign exchange prices.
The stacked regression is reported in the first two rows ofTable 2.
The second row of estimates corrects for heteroscedasticity acrossthe six
commodities. Either way, the negative coefficient on the money surpriseis17
indeed more highly significant than those in the regressions for individual
markets.
It is of some interest to see what happens Monday after the opening.
If the commodity prices were to continue to move in the same direction during
the course of trading on Monday, this would constitute evidence of less—than—
perfect efficiency in the market and an opportunity for speculative profits.
A sharp movement in the opposite direction would constitute evidence of the
same.17 Table 2 shows regressions of the changesduring Monday morning and
Monday afternoon against the Friday money surprise. The positive coefficients
show some movement in the opposite direction, but it is not statistically
significant. Nor is the movement enough to undo thesignificanceof the
negative reaction computed from the Friday close to mid—day Monday or to the
close Monday.
3.Conclusions
Our empirical findings can be used for two distinct purposes:(1) they
support the notion that during the 1980—82 period, the market had confidence
in the Fed's commitment to stick to its money growth targets, and (2) they
support the overshooting model of commodity prices.
If one looked at the reaction of interest rates alone to Fed announce-
ments, one could conceivably doubt the Fed's credibility. When a positive
money surprise causes interest rates to rise, it could be interpreted as a
sign that the market has revised upwards its expectations of money growth
and inflation. But our examination of the reaction of commodity prices refutes
this possibility. The movement of commodity prices in the opposite direction18
can only mean that the market expectsthe Fed to tighten the money supply
in the near future. In terms of equation(20), b must be large relative
to a
On the other hand, if one looked only atthe reaction of commodity prices
to Fed announcements, one couldconceivabJy doubt the sticky—price or over-
shooting model, and cling to a strictinonetarist view of the world in which
all prices are perfectly flexible. When a positive moneysurprise causes
commodity prices to fall, it would beinterpreted as a sign that the market
expects the Fed to reduce the moneysupply in the near future, a changewhich
in a flexible—price world is reflected equallyand instantaneously in all
prices. But our knowledge of thereaction of interest rates refutes this
possibility. The movement of interest ratesin the same direction as the
money surprise can only meanthat the anticipated future decrease in the
nominal money supply is a decrease in thereal money supply, causing higher
real interest rates and the other effectsof tightened liquidity.19
Footnotes
1. Examples from the academic literature are Bordo (1980), who shows that
raw goods prices respond more quickly to monetary growth than do manu-
factures prices, and Van Duyne (1979), who models the speculative
quality of commodities and gives further references.
2. The overshooting model of the exchange rate was developed by Rudiger
Dornbusch (1976).
3.Furthermore, the higher interest rate implies a fall in real money
demand in the long run. With no jump in the current level of the money
supply (as opposed to its growth rate), the long—run equilibrium path
of the price level must shift up discretely (in addition to becoming
steeper) in order to reduce the equilibrium real money supply. In the
exchange rate literature, e.g. Frenkel (1976), this is sometimes called
the "magnification effect". See equation (17) below.
4. The model is an application of Dornbusch (1976) with the price of
commodities substituted for the price of foreign exchange. We modify
the money supply process to allow for disturbances to the rate of
growth, in addition to the disturbances to the level that Dornbusch
considered. The two degrees of freedom in this money supply process
are sufficient to capture the two possible directions of reaction to
the weekly money supply announcements that we wish to choose between in
Section 3. But we could generalize the money supply process as much as
we want, as in Engel and Frankel (1982). The commodity price would
then be seen to move to reflect revisions in a presented discounted sum
of all expected future money supplies, whatever path they may follow.
5. The model is qualitatively unchanged if we adopt other interpretations
of .isuchas the rate of change of por jdefinedbelow. See20
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1982) or Engel and Frankel (1983).
6. The description of i —ias the real interest rate is loose, because
i is the short—term interest rate, while p is the expected long—term
inflation rate. However, the model is again qualitatively unchangedif
•e
we substitute the expected short—term inflation rate p .See,for
example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1982).
7. The assumption that output is fixed means that the excessdemand
referred to in equations (1) and (2) must be coming out of inventories.
It would be preferable to have manufactured output endogenouslydeter-
mined by demand: y d (and y =y+ ).Onceagain, the
model is not qualitatively altered by such an extension. See the
appendix to Dornbusch (1976).
8. Notice that
by ?+Sc
the secular inflation term in pexceeds that in p
C m
This is a general problem with the commodity arbitrage
condition (1). There are two possibilities. First, for an agricul-
tural commodity, pmay gradually increase relative to p
(monetary considerations aside) during most of the year, as long as
some of the previous harvest peak is being stored,and fall discon-
tinuously when the new harvest comes in. (In anticipation,the stocks
held would dwindle to zero before the harvest.) Thus there is no long—
run trend in .Alternatively,for a nonperishable,
nonrenewable commodity such as gold or oil, there may indeed be a
long—run trend in — ,la Hotelling. We are grateful to
Peter Berck and Rudiger Dornbusch for both of these explanations.
9. Grossman (1981), Conrad (1981), Engel and Frankel (1982), Roley
(1982), Urich and Wachtel (1981), Urich (1982), Cornell(1982a), and
Hardouvelis (1982).21
10. The empirical finding in the foreign exchange and equity markets is
also the same as this paper's empirical finding from the commodities
market: a significant negative reaction to money surprises. This
supports (1) the sticky—price or overshooting view, and (2) Fed credi-
bility in the market during the 1980—82 period.
11. The claim that the Money Market Services numbers do in fact represent
market expectations, and that these expectations are rational, is
supported in Grossman (1981) and in Engel and Frankel (1982), by a
demonstration that one cannot use exchange rates or interest rates on
the morning of the announcement, or relevant lags, to improve on the
survey number as a predictor of what the money announcement will be.
12. In this section we are using i to represent the, say, one—month
interest rate. If we were still using it to represent the instanta-
neously short—term interest rate as in the theory of the preceding
section, then the money demand equation (5) would preclude it from
jumping when m does not jump. The one—month interest rate can jump
even if the instantaneously short—term rate does not, because of an
increase in the future instantaneously short—term rates expected during
the following month. In Engel and Frankel (1982) it is shown in a
discrete—time version of our Section 2 model, that equation (19) holds,
with (1/@)ip (1 +Xe)/e(1+A)
13. The price is the price of the nearest maturing futures contract. The
data on opening (9:00 am Eastern Standard Time) and closing (3:00 pm
E.S.T.) prices coincide with those reported in the Wall Street Journal.
The data for cattle and feeders are from the Chicago Merchantile
Exchange, for cocoa and (world) sugar are from the New York Coffee,
Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, for gold and silver are from the New York22
Commodity Exchange, for the foreign currencies and Treasury bills are
from the International Money Market at the Chicago Merchantile
Exchange, and for Treasury bonds and GNMA's are from the Chicago Board
of Trade. Some futures contracts are traded during the same month that
they mature. Whenever this was the case, we skipped to the next
maturing contract. To insure consistency, whenever the month of the
nearest maturing contract changed, we made sure that the change did
not occur between Friday close to Monday close. The cash markets are
distinct from the futures markets. We did not use them because cash
price data are not available recorded at precise times before and after
the 4:10 money announcements.
14. On a few occasions, the Fed did not announce the money supply until
Monday. In that case we used the change in market price in the Tuesday
open from the Monday close. When Friday or Monday was amarket
holiday, we used the preceding market close or next market opening,
respectively.
15. While we would expect long—term interest rates to react in the same
direction as short—term interest rates, their reaction should be
damped. Cornell (1982a) shows that, while the reaction does decline
somewhat with the term of maturity, long—term bonds still react far
more than one would expect. Hardouvelis (1982) isolates this pheno-
menon by showing that the forward interest rates (implicit in the term
structure) react significantly as far out as ten years. These findings
seem to contradict the joint hypothesis of sticky prices (overshooting)
and Fed credibility, which all the other empirical evidence supports.
Hardouvelis argues that the paradox is explainable by a combination of
inflationary expectations and the real interest rate (in equation (20)23
above, "a" is large, but "b" is large as well). Or the excess reaction
in the long—term interest rates may be due to a risk premium, a factor
omitted from these monetary models.
16. One cannot rule out this possibility a priori. (Technically it would
be a failure of "superneutrality") For example, in a model
with risk, gold and silver might be considered the only effective
hedges against hyperinflation or nuclear war, and so their relative
prices might rise permanently in response to an increase in infla-
tionary fears. However Table 1 shows that the tendency of their prices
to move in the opposite direction from the money surprise is even
stronger than that for the other commodities.
17. The overshooting theory tells us that the commodity prices will come
back, but only very gradually over time, as the entire price level of
the economy adjusts to excess supply. This counter—movement should not
show up in one day of trading. But some market observers feel that
prices in fact overshoot by far more than is rational.24
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